Śankaracarya’s explanation of what bhāva and abhāva
न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; कि ं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवंघटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वसं ात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वंस्यात्, घटेन व्यपदि श्यमानत्वात्, घटस्येतरेतराभाववत्; तथवै भावात्मकताभावानाम ्
“And the cloth that exists when the pot is absent is not of the nature of ‘absence’ (abhāva);
what is it then? It is indeed of the nature of ‘being’ (bhāva). Similarly, even the prior non-existence (prāg-abhāva), destructional non-existence (pradhvaṁsa-abhāva), and
absolute non-existence (atyanta-abhāva) of the pot are other than the pot — because they are referred to with reference to the pot, just as mutual absence (itaretara-abhāva) is. Likewise tathaiva), even the absences of positive entities (bhāva-ātmaka-ta-abhāva) are (to be understood as distinct entities).”
~ Brihadaranyaka bhāsya, 1.2.1
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Analysis of Bhāva and Abhāva in the Context of Cloth (Paṭa) and Pot (Ghaṭa)
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Introduction: The Relationship Between Cloth and Pot
Śaṅkara employs a common and tangible example to investigate the philosophical concept of absence (abhāva). By referencing everyday objects — the cloth (paṭa) and the pot (ghaṭa) — he illustrates how absence is understood and the ontological status of being (bhāva) and non-being (abhāva).
2. Setting the Scene: A Familiar Example
Consider the following scenario:
● At time T1, a pot (ghaṭaḥ) is present on a specific spot on a table.
● At time T2, the pot is removed and replaced by a cloth (paṭaḥ).
An observer remarks: “The pot is absent here.”
This statement invites the question:
Is the cloth now occupying that spot to be interpreted as the “absence of the pot” (ghaṭābhāva)?
3. Śaṅkara’s Clarification: Cloth Is Not Absence
Śaṅkara asserts:
“na ca ghaṭābhāvaḥ san paṭaḥ abhāvātmakaḥ” (The cloth which exists when the pot is absent is not of the nature of non-existence [abhāva]).
This indicates that:
● The cloth is not an instance of absence.
● Rather, it is a positively existing, manifest entity (bhāva-rūpa).
● The cloth is distinct from “non-being” and should not be conflated with “lack of pot.”
Hence, even when the pot is not present and replaced by the cloth, the cloth maintains its own ontological status as a form of being.
4. Types of Absence (Abhāva) and Their Relation to the Pot
Śaṅkara identifies classical categories of absence acknowledged in Indian philosophical systems such as Nyāya and Vedānta:
● Prāg-abhāva: Non-existence prior to creation (e.g., before the pot’s manufacture).
● Pradhvaṁsa-abhāva: Non-existence following destruction (e.g., after the pot breaks).
● Ātyantika-abhāva: Eternal absence — something that never exists anywhere (e.g., a
pot on the moon).
● Itaretara-abhāva: Mutual exclusion (e.g., the pot is not the cloth, and vice versa).
He states:
“ghatasya prāk-pradhvaṁsa-ātyanta-abhāvānām api ghata-anyatvaṁ syāt” (Even these absences are distinct from the pot itself — they are “other than” the pot.)
5. The Epistemological Significance of Absence
These absences are characterized by their:
● Dependence on the concept of the pot,
● Definition only in relation to the pot,
● Non-identity with the pot (referred to as anyatva or “otherness”).
Śaṅkara explains this as: “ghatena vyapadiśyamānatvāt” (They are only known, identified, or spoken of in reference to the pot.)
For example, when saying:
● “There was no pot before it was made” (prāg-abhāva),
● “There is no pot now because it has broken” (pradhvaṁsa-abhāva),
● “There never was a pot in that desert” (ātyantika-abhāva),
one must first understand the nature of the pot itself. Only then can its absence be meaningfully discussed.
Similarly, mutual exclusion (itaretara-abhāva) demonstrates that two positive entities (cloth and pot) are mutually distinct, not that one is an absence or negation of the other.
6. Absences of Positively Existing Entities Are Dependent and Not Real Śaṅkara extends this reasoning:
“tathaiva bhāvātmakatā-abhāvānām”
(Likewise, absences of bhāva-rūpa [positively existent] things are only intelligible in relation to the entities they negate.)
This signifies that all forms of absence depend cognitively and conceptually on presence.
7. Summary
Pot (ghaṭa) The referent whose absence is considered.
Cloth (paṭa) Positively present when the pot is absent; it is not absence but
positive being.
Key Point Replacement of the pot by another entity does not equate that entity
to “absence.”
Deeper Point Absence (abhāva) is intelligible only in relation to real entities like the
pot. Advaitic Implication Only being (bhāva-rūpa) is ultimately real; absence is not ontologically independent.
8. The Nature of Bhāva-rūpa and Its Ontological Status
Śaṅkara’s example leads to a fundamental insight: absence depends on presence (bhāva)for intelligibility.
● The cloth exemplifies bhāva-rūpa — a positive, manifest being.
● Absence (abhāva) invariably references or contrasts with some bhāva-rūpa.
Thus, non-existence (abhāva) has no independent ontological status; it exists solely as a conceptual relation dependent on being.
9. Implications for Bhāva-rūpa in Advaita Vedānta
While cloth, pot, and all manifest entities are bhāva-rūpa (“forms of being”), in Advaita Vedānta, this status is not ultimately real (paramārthika satya).
● The ultimate Reality is Brahman — changeless, pure Being-Consciousness-Bliss
(sat-cit-ānanda), transcending all distinctions of existence and non-existence.
● The empirical world of bhāva-rūpa is mithyā — neither absolutely real nor unreal —
anirvacanīya (indefinable).
● Absence (abhāva) is likewise part of this empirical framework, dependent and relational,
and ultimately sublated by self-knowledge.
10. Conclusion
● All experiences and conceptualizations of “being” (bhāva-rūpa) are dependent realities,
not absolute.
● All “non-being” (abhāva) is conceptually dependent on “being” to be intelligible.
● This framework highlights the non-dual nature of Reality, transcending dualities such
as existence and non-existence.
Final Commentaries:
So, let’s relate this to darkness. If it is light now, day, and prakaśaḥ is permeating and then the
sun sets and it is now darkness, is the prakaśa abhāvaḥ? Check the 3 criteria.
1) Hasn’t been made yet
Well, the Sun is made, just absent. According to this, we do not have prakaśa abhāva.
2) It has been destroyed.
Well, it’s not destroyed, it’s away. According to this, we do not have prakaśa abhāva.
3) Like a chair on the moon, something that is indeed possible but simply will never happen.
Does it fall under this category? No, it happened in past, now and also will be there in the future.
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So, we can see that for the example of light, we do not get abhāva just because it sets and
night comes. On the other side of the coin, that means that darkness is not simply an absence
of prakaśa. Let’s analyse it again:
1) Is the darkness unborn?
It’s available, it just moved to the otherside of the planet. Beyond that, darkness is a Universal
principle. So no, darkness is not unborn. It is within temporality but simply absent and will return.
2) Is it destroyed?
No, temporarily moved.
3) Is it something that simply won’t happen, like someone flying up in a rocket and placing a chair on the moon?
No, it’s possible, it happens daily. It does happen and will happen. So again, darkness is at NO point abhāva. That means, when we are experiencing darkness, we’re experiencing a bhāvarūpa darkness. One last time, the proof? It does not fit categorisation of abhāva by śankar in his bhaṣya.
Prakarana Advaita 